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SCALE-INVARIANT AGGREGATE FLUCTUATIONS
OF DISCRETE INVESTMENTS
Makoto Nirei

ABSTRACT

This paper proposes a method to analyze endogenous fluctuations of aggregate
investment when firm-level investment follows an (S,s) policy and has a spillover effect on
other firms' investments. First, we derive the distribution function of aggregate fluctuations
in a partial equilibrium of differentiated product markets, under the assumption that a
firm's position in its (S,s) band follows a uniform distribution. Second, the variance of the
growth rate of average capital is shown to converge to a non-zero value when the number of
firms tends to infinity, if the technology exhibits constant returns to scale. Third, we
numerically compute the equilibrium paths in which the firms' positions evolve
deterministically. The simulations uphold our analytical results as well as exhibit echo
effects in the output series. Finally, a case of general equilibrium with imperfect
information is presented in which the analytical results continue to hold.

Key words: lumpy investment, (S,s) economy, self-organized criticality, contagion

SCALE-INVARIANT AGGREGATE FLUCTUATIONS
OF DISCRETE INVESTMENTS
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Introduction

This paper analyzes a model of endogenous fluctuations of aggregate investment which
arise from the lumpy behavior of investments at the firm level. It demonstrates that
aggregate fluctuations occur in a partial equilibrium of product markets even in a
deterministic environment with infinitely many agents when discrete investments at
the micro level have spillover effects.
The recent development of empirical studies on firm-level investments motivates
this paper. Researchers have shown the importance of discrete choice over the course
of a firm 's capital adjustment and a great deal of heterogeneity across firms by using
the longitudinal data. For example, Doms and Dunne (1998) found that establishment
level capital is adjusted only occasionally but by a jump. Based on the similar empirical findings , Cooper , Haltiwanger, and Power (1999) stressed the role that lumpy
investments played in aggregate fluctuations. Ericson and Pakes (1995) pointed out the
important effects of exit and entry behavior of firms on collective industrial dynamics,
presenting a framework for empirical research of firm dynamics.
These findings call for an analytical method for a dynamical system in which the
discrete behavior of many heterogeneous agents are coupled with each other. We consider a specific situation in which firms ' lumpy investments have spillover effects. Due
to the discreteness of the investment, a firm 's capital exhibits non-harmonic oscillation
if the capital is depreciated physically. With the spillover effect, the dynamics of the
system is then represented by a collection of coupled oscillators. This paper proposes
a method to characterize the aggregate fluctuations in this system.
The literature on (8,s) economies and on non-linear dynamics has tackled the question as to how to analyze the aggregate fluctuations that arise from micro-level discreteness, or more generally, micro-level non-linearity. The theory of (8,s) economies
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(Caplin and 8pulber (1987); Caballero and Engel (1991)) has developed an analytical
method without reducing the dimensions of agent heterogeneity. The theory showed
a robust tendency that the distribution of agents in an inaction region converges to
a uniform distribution in one-sided (8,s) economies. At the uniform distribution, the
adjustment at the extensive margin works exactly like the adjustment at the intensive margin so that the aggregate behavior does not differ from the smoothly-adjusting
case (the "neutrality" result). To the contrary, economic models of non-linear dynamics
have focused on the possibility of endogenous fluctuations arising from the micro-level
non-linearity. Brock and Hommes (1997), for example, demonstrated that the aggregate dynamics may be reduced to a low-dimensional non-linear map when the number
of types of agents is small. In fact, numerical studies of weakly-coupled non-linear
systems (Pikovsky, Rosenblum, and Kurths (2001)) have widely observed endogenous
aggregate fluctuations even in a greatly heterogeneous system.
The studies of weakly-coupled non-linear maps typically employ a homogeneous
collection of harmonic oscillators as a benchmark case to analyze the endogenous fluctuations. On the one hand, this "phase-dynamics" approach is useful to determine the
periodicity of the aggregate fluctuations. The aggregate fluctuation occurs only if there
is a certain degree of comovement across agents. Therefore, the frequency of aggregate
fluctuations centers around the average frequency of the natural rate of adjustment of
a firm , which in our model is determined by the lumpiness size divided by the depreciation rate. On the other hand, this approach obscures the economic point that the
aggregate fluctuation is caused by the synchronized timing of firm 's discrete investment, which is decided optimally rather than exogenously. We thus adopt a version
of interaction-based models (Brock and Durlauf (2001)). Previous studies in this class
of models have shown the possible comovement or "herding" of agents' actions (Gul
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and Lundholm (1995) for example). In particular, Ellison (1993) and Morris (2000)
have shown that a best response dynamic can result in a fast spread of a single action
("contagion") depending on the initial configuration of the actions. Our model endogenizes the configuration by incorporating the dynamics of agents' states. We show that
a large size contagion is likely to occur at the configuration to which the system has a
tendency to converge. This mechanism is best understood as a globally-coupled case
of the self-organized criticality introduced by Bak, Chen, Scheinkman, and Woodford
(1993). The dynamics of configuration organizes itself to a critical configuration, and
therefore the aggregate variables exhibit recurring fluctuations.
Our results build on the previous studies of one-sided (S,s) economies which show
that the distribution of a firm's position in the inaction band converges to a uniform
distribution. The results are divided into three parts. Firstly, an asymptotic distribution function of the aggregate fluctuation evaluated at the uniform distribution is
derived when the number of firms tends to infinity. Secondly, we show that the variance of the aggregate fluctuation does not vanish at the infinite limit of the number
of firms in a partial equilibrium of product markets if the technology exhibits constant
returns to scale. Thirdly, we compute the equilibrium path numerically and confirm
the emergence of endogenous fluctuations with a certain degree of periodicity.
Our model consists of many lTIonopolistic firms that are linked to each other by
the derived factor demand when each firm uses other firms ' products as intermediate
inputs. Their interaction forms a network of input-output relations with spillover effects
in capital adjustments. Suppose that a capital adjustment takes the form of a discrete
decision. Then there is a chance of a chain-reaction of investments in which one firm 's
investment triggers another's. This chain-reaction turns out to be represented by a
branching process in a partial equilibrium of product markets. The first result shows
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that the size of aggregate investment is sensitive to the detailed configuration of firms'
positions in the inaction region. As the depreciation of capital drives the evolution
of the configuration, the aggregate investment exhibits deterministic and endogenous
fluctuations. The second result provides a case where the neutrality result based on the
law of large numbers fails to hold. Even though an industry or an economy consists of an
infinitely many firms , the non-linear behavior at the firm level may not cancel out with
each other in aggregation. The third result confirms the analytical result of fluctuations
and shows the presence of the so-called echo effect. The sensitivity analysis shows that
constant-returns-to-scale is an important environment for the fluctuations. When the
wage and interest rate are fixed and returns to scale are constant , the equilibrium of
the product markets with monopolistic suppliers exhibits a "fragile" property. In this
environment, the size of the chain reaction of investments depends crucially on the
detailed configuration of the positions in the inaction band.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model; Section
3 details the analytical and numerical results; Section 4 concludes the paper.

2

Model

The product market consists of N monopolists and a representative household. Each
monopolist j produces a differentiated good

Yj ,

using capital k j and labor h j

.

Let us

specify the production technology by a Cobb-Douglas function:

(1)
Capital is accumulated over time as:

(2)
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where 5j is a firm-specific depreciation rate. Investment

ij ,t

is a composite good pro-

duced by combining all the goods symmetrically as:

(3)
where J1 - 1 > 0 is the mark-up rate. The production technology is allowed to exhibit
increasing returns to scale as long as a

+ , < J1 is satisfied.

We assume that the investment rate is chosen from a discrete set. Specifically, we
assume that:

!JL
k ·t

E {( 1 -

5 .) (A~t

] ,

where

Aj

{(I - 5j
k j ,t+1 ,

by

>

]]

1) }

x;t=O ,±1,±2,...

(4)

1. Note that the choice space for kj ,t is independent of the path: kj ,t E

)tkj ,oA]t}K-t=O,±1,±2,... .

This assumption implies that the next period capital ,

has to be either the depreciated level,

Aj.

-

k j ,t(1- 5j ),

or its multiplication or division

By this assumption, the producer is forced to invest in a lumpy manner. This

constraint is a shortcut for modeling the lumpy behavior which typically occurs as
optimal behavior when an investment incurs fixed costs. This assumption is the only
departure from the usual model of monopolistic product markets. The main objective
of this paper is to examine the aggregate consequence of the non-linear behavior of
producers induced by the discreteness constraint.
Let

Pj,t

index Pt ==

denote the price of good j at t and

(I:f=1 p~~(1-J.L) / N)l-J.L

Wt

denote a real wage. Define a price

and normalize it to one. Then the monopolist 's profit

at t is written as:
N

7rj ,t

== Pj ,tYj ,t

- Wthj ,t -

L Pl ,tZ!,j ,t

(5)

l=l

The demand function for good j is derived by the usual procedure as in Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977). Let us suppose that the representative household has preferences over
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the sequence of consumption and hours worked:
00

L (3t U(ct , H t )

(6)

t=O

where Ct is a composite consumption good produced similarly as the investment good:
Ct

=

r

(~(zf,)~ IN

(7)

The representative household maximizes the utility function subject to the sequence
of budget constraints:
N

LPj,tZ[t = WtHt
j=l

+ ITt

(8)

where ITt is the average dividend frOln firms: ITt == 2:f=l 7rj ,tl N .
Cost minimization of the consumer given the level of consumption Ct implies Zft =
p;,t/( P,-l) Ct and a relation 2:f=1 pj,tZftl N

=

Ct·

Similarly, the derived demand for

good j by the monopolist l given the level of investment il,t is obtained as Z;'l,t =
IN

I
_ .
B Y comb··
. h Yj,t -- Zj,t
C
an d "",N
Dj=l pj,tZj,l,t
- 'll,t·
1n1ng WIt

good j, these relations yield the demand function for good j

N
I
.c
+ "",
Dl=l Zj,l,t lor
as : Yj ,t = p;,t/(l -P,)(Ct + It)

Yt ==

(2:f=1 Y},~P, IN)P,. Then we

-p,/(p,-1).

Pj,t

'll,t

where It == 2:f=1 ij,t/N. Define a production index

have an equilibrium relation 2:f=1 Pj,tYj,t = Yt· Combining with the consumer's budget
constraint (8) and the equilibrium condition for labor, H t = 2:j hj,t/N, we obtain the
demand function:
..:::.1!:...
_

J.L-l~

Yj ,t - Pj,t

(9)

t

The monopolist maximizes its discounted future profits as instructed by the representative household. The discount rate,

rt 1 ,

is the marginal rate of intertemporal

substitution of consulnption. Then the monopolist 's problem is defined as follows:
max

00

00

(

N)

"'"'(r1·· .rt)-l 7r],- t = "'"'
(r1· · ·rt)-l P-tY
-t - Wth-t
- "'"'Plt
ZlI,],t
~
],
],
],
~
,
t=O
l=l

_ kh _ i - zI } ~
{ YJ ,t, J,t+ l , J,t, J,t, l ,j ,t t=O

(10)
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subject to the production function (1 ,3) , the capital accumulation (2) , the discreteness
of the investlnent rate (4) , and the demand function (9).
Let us define the average capital index K t as follows:
(11)
where p == a./(p, - ')') . Note that p < 1 holds by the assumption a.

+ ')' <

p,. By using

the optimality condition for hj,t, the profit at t is reduced to a function of (kj,t, kj,t+l)
as:
- -y

7rj,t

=

p ( j.L-l )

D oW t1 - -y Kt-Y=-;Y kJ,t - kj,t+l

+ (1 -

(12)

6j)k j ,t

where Do == (l-,),/p,)(A(,),/p,P)l/(l-'Y ). The profit is concave in kj,t due to p < 1. Thus
the optimal policy is characterized by an inaction region of kj,t with a lower bound kj,t
and an upper bound Ajkj,t. Consider two sequences of kj,s which are identical except
at s = t. Such sequences can be constructed by assigning a positive investment at t - 1
and zero investment at t in one sequence and zero investment at t - 1 and a positive
investment at t in the other sequence. Then the lower bound of the inaction region is
derived by solving for kj,t at which the two sequences yield the same discounted profit.
Namely, if kj,t is strictly less than kj,t, the producer is better off by adjusting it upward
rather than waiting. Let the sequence with zero investment at t - 1 have kj,t = kj,t ,
and let the other sequence have kj,t = Ajkj,t . Then the both sequences have the same
amount of capital at t - l and t+l: kj,t-l

=

(1/(1-6 j ))kj,t and (Aj(I-6 j ))kj,t. Solving

for kj,t which equates the discounted profits of the two sequences, we obtain:

D (A~ k *. t -- ( 0 J
J,
.
Aj - 1

1)) l~P

(

Tt

_

1 + U£ .) ~P

- 1

-1

J

( l --y)( l-p)

Wt

KCPt

(13)

where

(14)

8

Equation (13) expresses the strategic complementarity between the average capital
level K t and the threshold kj,t for an individual capital level kj,t. The degree of the
complementarity is represented by cp o A percentage change in average capital induces
cp percent change in the individual threshold kj,t . In particular , the movement in K t

and kj,t coincides if cp = 1. A simple manipulation reveals the following property.
Lemma 1 cp 2:: 1 if and only if a

+ "y 2:: 1.

Whether the complementarity effect exceeds one is solely determined by the returns to
scale, and is not dependent on the competitiveness of the market, f-L.
The spillover effect on kj,t is non-linear because of the threshold.

The average

capital level K t affects the threshold , but it mayor may not induce the adjustment of

kj,t. Hence the property of a firm 's capital choice may be summarized as local inertia
and global strategic complementarity. The individual capital is insensitive to a small
perturbation in the average capital level, while it synchronizes with the average capital
if the perturbation is large.

3
3.1

Results
Partial Equilibrium

Let us focus on the network of producers in the product markets while abstracting from
the rest of the economy by assuming that the equilibrium wage and interest rate only
depend on the average capital level. Suppose that the equilibrium wage and interest are
approximated by constantly elastic functions of the average capital K t in the vicinity
of the time-average levels of wage, interest , and average capital W, r, K:
Tt -

r-

1 + 6j
1 + 6j

(15)

9

(16)
This corresponds to a partial equilibrium assumption when Br = Bw = O. Section 3.3
provides a case in which the pricing functions above hold in a general equilibrium. By
assuming (15- 16), the threshold (13) is simplified as:

i;' = (i)

¢

(17)

J

where kj is a threshold corresponding to (f, w,K) , and ¢ represents the strategic
complementarity between the individual and average capital:
¢ = <p _ , Bw + (1 - , )Br

(1 - , )(1 - p)

(18)

Note that ¢ is less than <p if Br , Bw > O. This implies that the strategic complementarity
between producers is weakened due to the equilibrium response of the wage and interest
rate if the response is pro cyclical. The price response works as a dampening factor in
the investment propagation as emphasized by Thomas (2002).
The equilibrium of the product markets is given by a capital profile which satisfies

kj,t E [kj,t , Ajkj,t]. This condition allows multiple equilibria. Here we employ best
response dynamics introduced by Vives (1990) as an equilibrium selection algorithm.
Suppose that a predetermined capital kj,t resides within the inaction region. The capital
in the next period kj,t+l only decreases by depreciation unless adjusted . In the first step
of the best response dynamics, the producers adjust capital by Aj if their capital levels
go below kj,t given K t . Note that , assuming 6j < Aj , the adjustment never exceeds Aj.
In the second step, K t is calculated by a new capital profile, and the producers adjust
their capital according to the updated K t . This procedure is repeated until the capital
profile converges. The adjustments after the second step can be upward or downward ,
depending on whether the upward adjustments in the first step weigh more or less than
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the depreciation of overall capital. Let us formally define the best response dynamics
as follows. Set the initial point of the dynamics as kJ,t

= kj,t(1- 6j ) and

K~

= K t . The

average capital K;: after u = 1 is defined by the profile kj,t and definition (11). Then

kj,t, u = 0,1, ... , evolves according to the (S,s) rule:
Ajkj,t
u+1 k j,t
-

if k'l!-J,t < k~u
J,t

kj,tl Aj if kj,t > Aj kj,~
k Uj,t

(19)

otherwise

We can show that this dynamics converges at a finite stopping time T with probability
one when N

- t 00

and ¢

~

1. Thus the best response dynamics is a valid equilibrium

selection algorithm. We define the converged point as an equilibrium capital profile at
t

+ 1,

namely, kj,t+l = kIt.

The best response dynamics is a realistic equilibrium selection mechanism in a situation where many agents interact with each other. The only information needed for
an agent to make a decision is the prices and the average capital level. This selection mechanism precludes big jumps that occur due to the informational coordination
among agents. In this sense, the best response dynamics selects the least volatile among
possible equilibrium paths.
The aggregate investment fluctuates along with the evolution of configuration of
the capital profile.

To evaluate the magnitude of fluctuations analytically, we re-

gard the capital configuration as being a random variable that takes values within
the inaction region. Specifically, we assume that the position of an individual capital relative to the lower bound of its inaction region (in log-scale) follows a uniform
distribution independent across firms.

The uniformity assumption is motivated by

the theory of (S ,s) economies. Define a producer's position in an inaction region as

Sj,t

=

(log kj,t - log kj,t) I log Aj. If Sj,t is mutually independent across j, then

Sj,t+l

is
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mutually independent asymptotically as N

-* 00

for 1; < 1. Also the dynamics of Sj,t

shifts a uniform measure to itself. Hence the mutually independent uniform distribution is an invariant measure asymptotically for 1; < 1. Moreover, Engel (1992) shows
that Sj,t converges to the uniform distribution if its dynamics contain a random component whose distribution flattens over time. Caballero and Engel (1991) also shows
that the heterogeneity of Aj (as well as 6j in our model) contributes to the convergence
of a cross-section distribution of Sj to the uniform distribution. We will show that
the uniformity assumption brings us good insights on the unconditional fluctuations of
the aggregates. l In Section 3.2, we will see that a departure from this assumption, in
particular the correlation of Sj,t, provides a rich structure for the time-series properties
of the aggregates.
We assume that Aj and 6j are common across j. Then the periodicity of an individual oscillation is q

=

log Aj Ilog(1 - 6) I. Also the threshold kj,t becomes constant

across j. Define m = N(logKl-logKt)jlogA where Kl is the average capital at the
first step of the best response dynamics. m indicates the gap between the effects of
depreciation and of adjustments at the first step on the average capital. Also define W
as the total number of firms which adjust their capital in the best response dynamics
after the first step. Then we obtain the following proposition.

Proposition 1 Suppose that Aj and 6j are common across j. Suppose that Sj,t is a
random variable which follows a uniform distribution independently across j.

Then

'm j VN asymptotically follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance:
(J2
m

=

pj q

((1 - A-2
2p

)

log A _ (1 - A-p j q)
p

2)

1
.
(log A)2

(20)

If 1; :::; I , then IWI conditional to Iml follows an infinitely divisible distribution function
lSee Nirei (2005) for the case in which the distribution is not uniform.
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asymptotically as N

---t 00:

Pr (IWI = w Ilml) = Imle-¢W-Iml(¢w + Iml)W-l

(21)

w!

for w = 0, 1,. . .. The unconditional distribution of W is symmetric. The tail is approximated b71:

Pr (IWI

= w

11m!)

rv

(

Im le-(l-l/4»lm l )
~
¢ 27f

(e4> -l)-W W-1.5

The normalized aggregate capital growth rate N (log K t +1

-:;:-

(22)

<.p

-

log K t ) converges in distri-

bution to (m + W) log A.
Proof is deferred to Appendix A.
The key to the proof is to embed the best response dynamics in a branching process
which has the following recursive property. Let G (s) be the generating function of the
subsequent adjustments W, provided that the initial deviation from the time average
level is m = 1. Let x be the number of firms that adjust capital due to m, and F( s)
be its generating function. Each adjustment of x then has a chance to propagate in
the next step just like the initial adjustment m2. Thus the total number of offsprings
which are originated from each of x follows G( s). Hence we obtain a functional equation
G(s) = sF(G(s)), from which we derive the distribution of W. A similar functional
equation obtains in a generalized model with heterogeneous Ai and 6i and with nonuniformly distributed S~,t (see Nirei (2005)) . The functional equation characterizes
the propagation distribution completely, because any moment can be derived from the
functional.
Proposition 1 implies that the capital growth log K t + 1 -log K t conditional to m = 1
is approximated by a power distribution W-1.5 truncated by an exponential distribution
2The symbol'"" indicates that the ratio of the both sides converges to one as w

---t 00.
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that declines at rate 1- ¢. The capital growth conditional to m

=

1 has an asymptotic

mean log '\/(N(l- ¢)) and variance (log ,\/N)2(2 - ¢)/(1- ¢)3 for ¢ < 1. The variance
of the capital growth rate declines linearly in N, hence the law of large numbers obtains.
The fluctuation of the capital growth exhibits quite a different behavior when ¢ = 1.
The distribution of W becomes a power law distribution. With the exponent 0.5 (in a
cumulative distribution), the distribution does not have either mean or variance. That
is, the sample moments diverge as the sample size increases. In fact, the variance of
the capital growth rate ceases to depend on N for a large N when ¢

= 1, as we state

in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When ¢

=

I , the variance of the aggregate capital growth rate log K t + 1 -

log K t converges to a non-zero constant as N

---t 00.

The limit standard deviation is:

(23)

Proof is deferred to Appendix B.
This result means that the growth rate fluctuation becomes independent of the
number of firms as the number grows. No matter how large the aggregative system
is , the non-linearity of the individual behaviors can add up to aggregate fluctuations.
Formula (23) with (20) gives the standard deviation of growth rates as a function of the
lumpiness parameter ,\ and the periodicity q of capital oscillation at the agent level.
Some numerical examples are shown in Table 1. In the table, we observe that the
empirically plausible magnitude of lumpiness is large enough to generate the fluctuations in aggregate production observed in the business cycles. Table 1 also shows little
dependence of the fluctuation Inagnitude on the mark-up rate. In fact the standard
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deviation is not significantly changed even when the mark-up rate goes to infinity, at
which O"~ is simplified to (1 - l/q)/q.
Our analytical results imply two things on the investment propagation. First , it
challenges the conventional view that the sectoral propagation does not add up to a
large aggregate fluctuation due to the law of large numbers effect. Our result shows
that, when the response of wage and interest rate is rigid enough, the sectoral propagation can generate a significant fluctuation in aggregate level. Secondly, our result shows
that the large, non-degenerate investment fluctuation can occur endogenously in a deterministic environment. This implies that an interaction of small non-linear behaviors
at the micro level may playa crucial role in aggregate investment fluctuations .
The distribution formula (21) exhibits a non-normal, heavy-tailed distribution that
converges to a power-law distribution as ¢

~

1. This property is well understood in the

light of critical phenomena. The propagation process is a branching process with mean
¢. Thus the behavior of the propagation process under the uniform distribution of

Si

is essentially identical to a percolation on a Bethe lattice (Grimmett, 1999, page 254)
with 1- ¢ being the difference of the probability from a critical probability. It is known
that the cluster volume in the percolation follows a power law with exponent -1.5 at
mark-up (p, - 1)

0.02
0.02

0.05

0.1

0.2

0.02

0.05

0.1

0.2

4

0.92

2.29

4.56

9.07

0.92

2.29

4.57

9.10

6

0.82

2.04

4.07

8.11

0.82

2.04

4.08

8.13

8

0.75

1.87

3.73

7.43

0.75

1.87

3.73

7.44

lumpiness (log),)

periodicity (q)

0.2

Table 1: Limiting standard deviations of capital growth 9 (percent)
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the criticality ¢ = 1, which corresponds to our power law in (22) for ¢ = 1. -Also, the
second moment of the cluster is proportional to an inverse cube of the difference to the
critical probability, just as we have (1- ¢)-3 in the asymptotic variance of the growth
rate. We can interpret the criticality condition ¢ = 1 as the case of perfect strategic
complementarity across firms. By perfect complementarity we mean that a proportional increase in capital of all the other firms induces the same proportional increase
in capital of a firm , if the increment is larger than the lumpiness. A shock smaller than
the lumpiness, however, does not cause a symmetric movement across firms because of
the lumpy behavior. The power-law distribution of aggregate growth rates is caused
by the perfect complementarity in a global range and no complementarity in a local
range.
The possibility of a power-law distribution of sectoral propagation was first pointed
out by Bak et al. along the lines of the literature of self-organized criticality. The point
of the literature is that the critical phenomena, which are broadly associated with the
power-law distributions, can occur at the sink of a class of dynamical systems, whereas
such criticality had been believed to require a fine tuning of parameters. The "selforganization" mechanism to arrive at a critical point is expressed in our model as a
convergence of

Si

to a uniform distribution. The result differs in the exponent of the

power-law distribution, which is 1/2 in our model and 1/3 in Bak et al. The difference
arises from the topology of the network. The latter assumes a two-dimensional lattice
network in which two avalanches started from neighboring sites can overlap. This leads
to the longer chain of reaction and thus the flatter power-law tail. Our model assumes a
global interaction which corresponds to an infinite-dimension case of the lattice models.
This setup enables us to treat the two neighboring avalanches as mutually independent
and to utilize the recursive structure of the branching process.

16

3.2

Dynamics

So far , we have focused on the case in which the firms' positions relative to the threshold follows a uniform distribution. Aggregate investment is shown to be sensitive to
the configuration of the positions. Aggregate investment will exhibit fluctuations along
with the evolution of the configuration which is driven by the depreciation of capital.
In this section we investigate the dynamic path of the aggregate fluctuations by numerically computing the perfect foresight equilibrium path of the product market with
the wage and interest fixed at the time-average level.
Parameters are specified as follows. The returns-to-scale parameter ex
various values close to one. The labor's share of income

r/ p,

+r

takes

is equal to 0.58. The

mark-up rate p, - 1 is set at 0.2. To determine the time-average levels of the aggregate
variables, we specify the utility function to be quasi-linear, U( Ct , H t )

= log C t

-

Ht .

The annual discount rate of utility is set at (3 = 0.96. The annual depreciation rate
of capital 5j is assumed to follow a uniform distribution between 0.01 and 0.2. The
lumpiness Aj follows a normal distribution with mean 1.5 and standard deviation 0.2.
The equilibrium is computed sequentially for 200 quarters, and the first 100 quarters
are discarded in order to focus on the stationary fluctuations. Figure 1 plots a salnple
path of such an equilibrium for the case N = 500000 and ex + r = 0.999. We observe a
considerable fluctuation of the investment and output, as well as some persistence in
the both series.
We compute the standard deviation and the autocorrelation of y for each path,
and repeat the procedure for 100 times for each parameter set (except for the case
N = 500000 in which we repeat for 12 times due to heavy computational load) . Table

2 reports the mean and standard deviation of the computed standard deviations and
auto correlations of output for various parameters. The standard errors of the estimates
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Figure 1: A simulated path of output (Y) and investment (1) when N
ex

+ I' =

= 500000 and

0.999

are reported in parentheses.
Table 2 confirms that the magnitude of the fluctuation is increasing as the returns to
scale approach to one. The magnitude decreases as the number of firms increases, but
even for the case of 500, 000 firms the model generates significant fluctuations. Considering that the number of operating manufacturing plants in the U.S. is about 350,000
(Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power (1999)) and that over half of the plants experience
a I-year capital adjustment of at least 37% of the capital in the estimate of Doms and
Dunne (1998), we find it a quantitative possibility that the aggregate fluctuations with
magnitude of empirical business cycles endogenously arise from microscopic discrete
investments. We also observe in Table 2 that the model generates considerable autocorrelation in output. The synchronization of oscillating capital alone can generate
auto correlations via echo effects , while the significant heterogeneity in lumpiness and
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Standard deviation of Y (%)

N

Autocorrelation of Y (%)

a+ l'

0.9

0.99

0.999

0.9

0.99

0.999

500

0.66

4.71

16.87

43.48

65.63

92.79

(0.06)

(0.59)

(3.55)

(8.23)

(5.23)

(2.94)

0.20

1.92

9.32

39.71

55.11

81.50

(0.02)

(0.23)

(1.47)

(8.74)

(7.52)

(4.92)

0.07

0.66

4.59

40.80

49.48

67.30

(0.01 )

(0.07)

(0.61)

(8.01 )

(6.85)

(5.53)

0.02

0.22

1.87

41.53

46.26

59.79

(0.00)

(0.02)

(0.23)

(5.90)

(6.55)

(8.34)

5000

50000

500000

Table 2: Standard deviation and autocorrelation of output
depreciation rates across firn1s prevents the capital from being completely synchronized
and exhibiting perfect phase-locking.

3.3

A case of general equilibrium with imperfect information

This section presents a particular case of general equilibrium in which the approximated
pricing formulae (15- 16) hold exactly. We consider a model of imperfect information in
which the households do not observe the distribution of firms ' positions relative to the
thresholds. We assume that the households expect the future investment demand function to be the same as its smoothly-adjusting counterpart as a result of the asymmetric
information. It is also assumed that the depreciation rate of capital is one hundred
percent.
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Let us specify the instantaneous utility function as:

(24)
Then the household 's optimal choice must satisfy:
(25)
The households expect firm j to maximize the discounted value of profits (10) by choosing a stream of capital

kt+l

without the discreteness constraint (4). By aggregating

the first order conditions across j, and by applying 6j

=

1, we obtain that for any t:

- ,,/(l- " )KP-l
t
= Tt

PD OWt

(26)

Aggregate demand for labor is obtained by aggregating the first order condition for the
maximization problem (10) with respect to

hj,t

as:
(27)

Plugging the same first order condition to the production function yields in aggregation:
(28)
Along with the definition of the discount rate for the firm 's dynamic optimization,
Tt = (Ct/ct_1yr

yt,

C t , Ht, Tt,

//3,

and

the above equations (25, 26, 27, 28) determine the growth rates of
Wt

given that of K t . By solving for
W
W
T

-

r

(~)

Wt

and

Tt,

we obtain:

(1 -')')( p - 1)+av
1 -,),

(~) (p-')('-yf,;)

(29)
av:r
( l- ')') (1 + v )

(30)

These recover our approximation (15,16). The sensitivity of the prices to the capital
growth, (Br, Bw ), is positive when v is large. In a special case of quasi-linear utility
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function in which v

= 0, we obtain a negative sensitivity BT = Bw = (1 - ,)(p - 1) for

, <1.

Consider a general case where 6j is not 1 (but still constant across j). Then the
equation system is reduced to:
'rt -

1+ 6

(31)

T

(32)

T

The functional relation is not exactly same as our approximation (15, 16) , yet we can
calculate the sensitivity parameter BT, Bw in the neighborhood of the time-average level:

d log 'Wt I
d log K t r,'liJ,k

(1 - ,)(p - 1)(1 - (1 - 6)/f)
1 + v - ,(1 - 6)/f

dlOgTtl
-B
dlog K t r,'liJ,k - w

+ av

(1+_v )-~
1- ,

1- ,

(33)

(34)

We can see that , for the quasi-linear case v = 0, Bw = BT < 0 holds for any 6. We obtain

Bw ~ 0 and BT

~

0 when p

~

1. Thus, the prices do not respond to capital when,

for example, the technology exhibits constant returns to scale and the goods perfectly
substitute with each other (J..l

f3

~

~

1). The prices are also irresponsive when 6 = 0 and

1. Namely, the general equilibriun1 effect by the adjustment of wage and interest

rate is small when the unit time is short so that the rates of capital depreciation and
utility discounting are small.
These results crucially depend on the particular assumption on the household 's expectation. Since the actual investment generally differs from the expected investment ,
the equilibrium is different from the household 's expectation. In particular , the equilibrium consumption is determined as output less investment , and thus the marginal
rate of intertemporal substitution

Tt

differs ex post from the one applied by firms.
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4

Conclusion

This paper characterizes the aggregate fluctuations arising from spillover effects of
discrete investments at the firm level. The theory of one-sided (8,s) economies has
shown that the distribution of a firm 's position in an inaction band has a robust
tendency to converge to a uniform distribution. Based on the theory, we evaluate the

deterministic fluctuation of aggregate investment along the ergodic evolution of the
configuration as a stochastic fluctuation whose randomness arises from the stochastic
configuration of the capital. For each configuration, one-period aggregate investment
is derived by a fictitious best-response dynamics of firms' investment decisions. The
best response dynamics unconditional to the initial configuration can be embedded in a
branching process. This enables us to derive the distribution function of the aggregate
fluctuation in an explicit form.
In a partial equilibrium of product markets , the aggregate investment follows a
power-law distribution with an exponential truncation at the tail.
speed is determined by 1 - (a

+ r ) where a + r

The truncation

is the returns to scale of production

technology. Under the constant returns to scale, the aggregate investment follows a
power-law distribution, and its variance is shown to be strictly positive even when there
are an infinite number of firms.
The equilibrium path of the model is numerically computed. The simulation confirms the validity of the analysis above, and also finds that the paths of output and
investment show persistence and mild periodicity. This expresses the echo effect in
which a clustering of investments in a period reappears after several periods. The
frequency of the echo effect is determined by the natural frequency of a firm 's capital adjustment, which in our case is equal to the lumpiness (log Aj) divided by the
depreciation rate (Ilog(l - oj) I).
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Appendix
A

Proof of Proposition 1

Let us rewrite the best response dynamics in t. We use u to denote the step in the
dynamics and suppress t. Let KU denote the average capital defined by (11) with a
profile kj for u 2:: l. Define kjU by the threshold formula (17) with KU for u 2:: l. For
u = 0, we define KO = K t and kjO = kj,t. Define sj = (log kj - log kjU)/ log A. Then
the dynamics of (kj, sj) is written as follows.

kq

k j ,t(1 - 5)

(35)

SO

Sj,t + (log kJ,t - log kj,t) / log A

(36)

J

J

kUA
J

k~+l
J

(37)

kj/A if sj > 1
k"-!-J

S~+l
J

if sj < 0

=

otherwise

sj + (log kj+l -log kj - ¢(log K u +1 - log K U))/ log A

(38)

We consider the case m 2:: O. Then sj > 1 never happens in the best response
dynamics for u 2:: 1. The case m < 0 is proved symmetrically by changing the sign
of adjustments in logarithm. Define Hu for u 2:: 1 as the set of j such that log kj log kj-l = log A. Then log kj = log kj-l for u

tf. Hu.

Define mu as the size of Hu'

First we examine m = N(log Kl - log K t )/ log A. We break m into two terms as
m = N(log Kl -lOg(2:f=l (kJ)P)l/P)/ log A + N (log (2:f=1 (kJ)P)l/P -log K t )/ log A. The
second term represents the depreciation and is equal to N log (1 - 5) / log A =

-

N / q. The

first term represents the first-step adjustments induced directly by the depreciation.
By the assumption that Sj,t follows a uniform distribution, we obtain Pr( sJ < 0) =

1/q.
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Then m1 follows a binomial distribution Bin(N, l/q). Thus:
N

) l/p

log K1 - log ; ; (kJ)P

(1/ p) (lOg

=

(

(),.P L
. HI
JE

(1/ p) log

(p,.p - 1)

(kJ)P
N

L

+

·dH
J'F I

t

(kJ)P) - log
(kJ)P)
N
·1
N
J=

(I: (1)P) / (t (1)P)
JEHI

(l/p)log

(

()..P-l) (

k; is constant across j

The last line utilized that

+

1)

J=l

)..sap)

.L ;
JEHI

p
(N
)..sa )
/ ~;

+1

)

(39)

J=1

when )..j and 6j are constant. Since sJ

is distributed uniformly, the strong law of large numbers implies that, with probability
one,
lim

N

L

\

sJp
N

N-+oo j=l

r )..sJPdsq =
Jo
1

=

_A-

J

\

P

1

(40)

_A_-_

P log)..

Also, j E HI is equivalent to 0 :::; sJ < 1/ q. Thus, by the central limit theorem,

VN("'£jEHI )..sJp /N - J~/q )..sJPdsJ)
in distribution as N

---7

00

=

VN("'£jEHI )..sJp /N - ()..p/q -1)/(plog )..)) converges

to a normal distribution with mean zero and variance:

1)2 = )..2p/q - 1_ ()..P/q - 1)2

1/q )..2saPdsq _ ()..P/q j
o
J
plog)..

10

2plog)..

By regarding (39) as a nonlinear function F( x) of x =

plog)..

"'£jEHI

(41)

)..sJp /VN, we can use the

delta method to obtain the asymptotic distribution of VN F(x) as a normal distribution
with mean F(xo) and variance F'( xo? Avar(x) where Xo is the asymptotic mean of x.
The mean F(xo) is calculated as:

(l/p) log (

()..P -1)()..p/q -1)/(plog)..)
) _ log)..
()"P-l)/(plog)..)
+1 q

(42)

and the variance is:

(43)
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By collecting the results , it is shown that m/ ffi asymptotically follows a normal
distribution with mean zero and the variance (43) divided by (log A)2.
Next we derive a limit for N(log Ku+l - log KU) for u 2:: 1. The Taylor series
expansion yields:
N(log K u+1 -log K U)

(44)
The residual term in the first equation is of order 1/N , because it consists of the terms
involving 8Ku /8kj which is of order l/N , and because the number of terms (the size
of H u +1 ) is finite with probability one as is shown later. The second equation holds
since kjU is constant across j. For the same reason the third equation obtains , since

K U = k*U (Lf=1 AS'j P/N)I / P holds. The average Lf=1 AS'jP/N converges to E[As'jP] as
N

- t 00

almost surely. The expectation is equal to fol AS'jPdsj

because the following three facts hold as N

- t 00

is uniformly distributed in [l-l/q , l), sj for j

=

(AP - l)/(plogA) ,

as we see later, namely, sj for j E HI

tf:

U ~=IHv

is uniformly distributed in

[0 , 1 - l/q) , and U~=1 Hv is finite with probability one. Also,

LjEHu + 1

AS'jP converges

to m u+l in distribution. This is because sj < ¢ (log KU -log K u-l) / log A for j E Hu+l
and the right hand side is of order 1/N as (44) shows. Thus the summation becomes to
follow a binomial distribution. Hence, we obtain for u 2:: 1 a convergence in distribution:

(45)
Next we examine m u conditional to mu-l for u 2:: 2. We have Pr(j E Hulj

tf:

Uv=I ,2,...,u-lHv) = (¢ (log K U-log Ku-l)/ log A)/((N - L~:t m v )/ N). Thus mu follows
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Bin(N - I:~':i m v, (¢(log K U - log K U-I) I log A) I ((N - I:~,:i mv) IN)). This defines
the stochastic process mu completely. As we let N

------t

00,

the limit (45) holds and the

binomial distribution of 'mu converges to a Poisson distribution with mean ¢mu-I for

u

~

3. For u

=

2, m2 converges in distribution to a Poisson with mean ¢m where the

distribution of m is defined conditionally on mI.
Since a Poisson distribution is infinitely divisible , the Poisson variable with mean

¢mu-I is equivalent to a mu-rtimes convolution of a Poisson variable with mean ¢.
Thus the process mu for u

~

2 conditional to m is a branching process with a step

random variable being a Poisson with mean ¢ for u

~

3 and m2 following a Poisson

with mean ¢m. Since ¢ :::; 1, the process mu reaches 0 by a finite stopping time
wi th pro babili ty one (see Feller (1957)). Thus the best response dynamics is a valid
algorithm of equilibrium selection. Let T denote the stopping time. Using the previous
asymptotic results, we have W

------t

I:~=2 mu in distribution. By using the property

of the Poisson branching process (Kingman (1993)), we obtain an infinitely divisible
distribution called Borel-Tanner distribution for the accumulated sum W conditional
to 'm2 as:

(46)
for w = m2, 'm2 + 1, .... Using that m2 follows the Poisson distribution with mean ¢m,
we obtain (21) in the Proposition as follows:
w

Pr(W = w I m)

=

L

((m2Iw)e- ¢W (¢w)W- m2 /(w - 'm2)!)e- mm m2 1m2!
W

(me-¢W-ml w )

L

(¢w)W-m 2m m2- 1 /((w - m2)!(m2 - I)!)

(me- ¢w-m Iw)(¢w + m)W-I/(w - I)!

(47)
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Approximation (22) is obtained by applying the Stirling's formula w!

rv

V2'ire- ww w+O.5:

me-<Pw-m(¢w + m)w-l/w!
me-<Pw-m(¢w + m)w-l /( V2'ire- ww w+O.5)
me(l-<p)w-m((¢w + m)/(¢w))W((¢w + m)/(¢w))-1¢w- 1w-1.5 /.;2;
(me(1/<p-l)m /(¢.;2;)) (e<P- 1/¢)-wW-1.5

(48)

This completes the proof.

B

Proof of Proposition 2

We focus on (m + W)/ N, provided with the relation (log K t + 1 -log K t )/ log A rv (m +

W) / N shown in the previous proof. The unconditional variance is decomposed as
follows:

E(Var(~ Im))+Var(~+E(~ 1m))
E[E (var (~ 1m, m2) 1m) +Var (E (~ 1m, m2)

+Var G+E(E(~ Im, m2) 1m)) .
W asymptotically follows a branching process when N

--+ 00 ,

1m) 1
(49)

and by the nature of the

branching process , IWI conditional to Im21 is equivalent to the 1m2 I-times convolution
of W conditional to m2 = l. Using these facts, we obtain that:

Var(W/N I m,m2)
E(E(W/N I m,m2) 1m)

Im 2IVar(W/N I m2

=

1)

E(m2 I m)E(W/N I m2

mE(W/N I m2

=

1).

(50)

= 1)
(51)
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Also, Im21 conditional to m asymptotically follows a Poisson distribution with mean Iml
and the unconditional distribution of m2 is symmetric. Since m/ VFi asymptotically
follows N(O, O"~) by Proposition 1, we can use the formula E(lml/VFi)

-----?

O"mJ2/rr.

Applying these, we obtain:

Var

(m; W)
E [E (1 m2I 1m) Var (~ I m2 = 1) + Var( m2 1m) ( E (~ I m2 = 1) ) 2]

+Var(~+E(~

Im2=1)E(m2I m))

(CImV2/7r)E (:'25 1m2 = 1) + CI~

(Jv + E (~ 1m2 = 1)

Next we calculate limN-+oo E(w/VFi I m2

=

r

(52)

1) , provided that the best response

dynamics reaches an equilibrium before all the N firms adjust . Namely, we take the
expectation conditional to W

~

N for a fixed N by using the asymptotic probability

function taken from (46) :

Pr(W = w I m2 = 1, W ~ N) Pr(W ~ N) = e- ww w- 1/w!.
Proof of Proposition 1 shows that the probability of the event W
one as N

-----?

00.

~

(53)

N converges to

By using the inequality (see Feller (1957)):

(54)
we can compute the upper and lower bounds of the probability of W for a fixed N as
follows.
N

E(w/ VFi I 'm 2 = 1

vV

~ N) Pr(W ~ N) =

L

e- www/(w!VFi)

w =l

<

N

L
w=l

e-ww w/( y'2;w w+O.5e - w+l/(12w+1)VFi)
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w=l

!oN w- 05 dw/V27rN

<

~N~oo J2/7r

(55)

The second to last line holds because e- 1/(12w+l) is bounded by one. Similarly, the
lower bound turns out to converge to the same value. Let us note that the function
e- 1/(12w)w - O.5 is decreasing for w > 1/6. Then we obtain:
N

L

e-www/(w!VN) >

w=l

N

L

e- ww w/(vf2; w w+O.5 e -W+l/(12w)VN)

w=l

>

w =l
N

r

1
Jl + e- 1/(12w)w - O.5dw/V27rN

(e- 1/(12(N+1))VN +

1 - e- 1 / 12

+i

N 1

+ w- L5 e- 1/ (12w) /12dw ) /(O.5V27rN)

~ N~oo J2/7r

(56)

Hence, E(w/VN I m2 = 1, W ~ N) ~ J2/7r. Similarly, E(W2/N1.5 I m2 = 1) is
calculated as follows.
N

E(W2/N1.5 1m2

=

1, W ~ N) =

L

e- ww w+1/(w!N1. 5)

w =l

w=l
N

L

e- 1/( 12w)../W/( vf2;N1. 5)

w =l

> (iN e- 1/(12W)JWdW ) /(vf2;N L5 )
(( e- 1/( 12N) N L5

_

e- 1 / 12 ) /l.5 + iN (W L5 /l.5)e - 1/( 12w) (1/ (12w2) )dw) / (vf2; N L5 )
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(e-' /( 12N) _ e-'/12/N'S)/(1.5..;2n-) + ],N w-OSe-1/( 12W) dw/(l8..;2n-NLS)
~

1/(1.5..;2n-)

(57)

where the inequality in the fourth line holds since the function e- 1/(12w) Vw is increasing
in w. Similarly, the upper bound is obtained as follows.
N

L

e- ww w+1/(w!N1. 5) <

N

L

e- WwW+l/(..;2n-wW+O.5e - W+l/(12w+l)N1.5)

w =l

w=l

w=l
N

r

1
< Jl + e- 1/(12W+l)y'Wdw/(..;2n-N1. 5)

(e- 1/(12N+13)(N
~

+ 1)"S _

e- 1/ 13 + ],N+1 w- OS e- /(12w+1)(12/(12
'

+ I/W)2)dW) /(l.5..;2n-NLS)

1/(1.5..;2n-)

(58)

Hence, we obtain that E(W2/N1.5 1m2

=

1) ~ 1/(1.5v'21f). Collecting the results, we

obtain that:
Var

(m; W)
(fm

~N-'>(X)

J2/

7r E

(:'2S

I m2 = 1) + Var (

fit )

(f?n (

~ + E (~ I m2 = 1) ) 2

(2/7f)((Jm + 1/3)(Jm

(59)

Hence, the capital growth rate asymptotically has variance (59) times (log ,\)2.
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Abstract
This paper proposes a method to analyze endogenous fluctuations of aggregate investment when firm-level investment follows an (S,s) policy and has a
spillover effect on other firms ' investments. First, we derive the distribution
function of aggregate fluctuations in a partial equilibrium of differentiated product markets, under the assumption that a firm's position in its (S,s) band follows
a uniform distribution. Second, the variance of the growth rate of average capital
is shown to converge to a non-zero value when the number of firms tends to infinity, if the technology exhibits constant returns to scale. Third, we numerically
compute the equilibrium paths in which the firms' positions evolve deterministically. The simulations uphold our analytical results as well as exhibit echo
effects in the output series. Finally, a case of general equilibrium with imperfect
information is presented in which the analytical results continue to hold.
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Introduction

This paper analyzes a model of endogenous fluctuations of aggregate investment which
arise from the lumpy behavior of investments at the firm level. It demonstrates that
aggregate fluctuations occur in a partial equilibrium of product markets even in a
deterministic environment with infinitely many agents when discrete investments at
the micro level have spillover effects.
The recent development of empirical studies on firm-level investments motivates
this paper. Researchers have shown the importance of discrete choice over the course
of a firm 's capital adjustment and a great deal of heterogeneity across firms by using
the longitudinal data. For example, Doms and Dunne (1998) found that establishment
level capital is adjusted only occasionally but by a jump. Based on the similar empirical findings , Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power (1999) stressed the role that lumpy
investn1ents played in aggregate fluctuations . Ericson and P akes (1995) pointed out the
important effects of exit and entry behavior of firms on collective industrial dynamics,
presenting a framework for empirical research of firm dynamics.
These findings call for an analytical method for a dynamical system in which the
discrete behavior of many heterogeneous agents are coupled with each other. We consider a specific situation in which firms ' lumpy investments have spillover effects . Due
to the discreteness of the investment, a firm 's capital exhibits non-harmonic oscillation
if the capital is depreciated physically. With the spillover effect, the dynamics of the
system is then represented by a collection of coupled oscillators. This paper proposes
a method to characterize the aggregate fluctuations in this system.
The literature on (8,s) economies and on non-linear dynamics has tackled the question as to how to analyze the aggregate fluctuations that arise from micro-level discreteness, or more generally, micro-level non-linearity. The theory of (8,s) economies
2

